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Abstract This article has four main objectives. First, it introduces the ideal
types of domination of Weber. Contrary to the received wisdom, which knows
only “three ideal types” (traditional, charismatic and legal rational) I present the
“fourth” type of domination, Weber called “Wille der Beherrschten” as an
important correction of his ideal type of legal-rational authority. Next I make
a novel, critical distinction between patrimonial and prebendal types of tradi-
tional authority. Third, I discuss various ways that communist regimes tried to
legitimate themselves and how they entered eventually a legitimation crisis,
leading to the collapse of communism. In the next section, I explore the
different ways post-communist capitalisms seek legitimacy (with various com-
binations of legal rational authority and patrimonialism), and finally I conclude
with a trend of re-convergence of some post-communist systems (especially
Russia and Hungary, but with signs for similar trends elsewhere) into an
illiberal, prebendal quasi-democratic system.
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Introductory notes on Weber’s theory of power, domination,
and legitimacy
The main purpose of this article is to explore whether post-communist capital-
ism, at least some versions of it, can be regarded as legitimate authority. The
nature of political regimes of certain post-communist regimes, especially the
rule by Presidents Putin and Xi and since 2010 that of Hungarian Prime
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Minister Orbán’s government, is often hotly debated, nevertheless the question
whether these regimes are legitimate at all and if so on what ground do they
claim legitimacy is rarely posed.1
When a system can be called “legitimate” can be debated and the answers to
these questions depend to a large extent on our definition of terms. The aim of
my article is rather limited. My point of departure is Max Weber’s theory of
legitimacy and the only question I pose is: Were communist and are
post-communist regimes of Putin, Xi, or Orbán legitimate in terms of Weber’s
theory, and if they are, what are the bases of their claim for legitimacy?
Weber ’s distinction between power (Macht) and domination/authority
(Herrschaft) is crucial to answer this question. The dispute how to translate
Herrschaft into English is indicative of the controversy about some of the
issues of legitimacy. Talcott Parsons offered one of the first—at that time still
incomplete—translations of Economy and Society into English. He translated
Herrschaft in a very American way as “authority.” 2 The term—which is
occasionally also used by Weber—implying the respectability of those who
issue commands, rather than emphasizing the asymmetry of power relationships
between those who dominate and those who are subordinated to domination.3
Gerth and Mills just about the same time (Parson was a political conservative,
while Mills was on the political left, and Gerth as a native German speaker had
an arguably deeper understanding of what “Herrschaft” meant) both translated
Herrschaft as “domination.”4 Whether Herrschaft means authority or domination
is of some importance to understanding Weber’s work and especially the theory
of legitimation.5 Weber himself was hesitant in his terminology. In the earlier
drafts of Economy and Society, he used the term “authority” quite often, but as
he was redrafting the work for what was eventually published as chapters 1-4
in the version of the book edited by Marianna Weber (Weber 1978), in the
1 There is a gigantic literature on this matter, mainly debating whether countries like Russia, Belarus, and
Hungary still can be called democracy, or did they turn into “managed democracy” (P. Anderson 2007) or are
they already “autocracies” (Kormai 2014), “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria 1997). Some even call those
regimes neo-fascist or neo-communist. Nevertheless, the question of legitimacy is relatively rarely posed,
which may have a lot to do with the absence of analytical clarity of the concept of legitimacy. After Putin’s
election to the presidency in 2012, Russian journalists suggested Putin is “illegitimate” (Russian journalists
2012). The former liberal mayor of Budapest, Gábor Demszky, called the Orbán regime illegitimate (See
Rádai Eszter 2014). There are also some attempts though to see new types of legitimacy emerging in
post-communist “managed democracies” or “autocracies.”Daniel Bell sawConfucianism as a new legitimating
principle of post-Maoist China (Bell 2008), Ossinovski, in an intriguing MSc dissertation, sees Putin’s
Russia as a combination of charismatic and legal-rational authority (Ossinovski 2010)
2 Astonishingly, Parsons does not translate the term “Herrschaft” even ONCE as “domination.” He is in pain
when he has to translate “Herrschaft” from the German original—see MWG, Band 23, 2013, p. 210—where
Herrschaft is so obviously not simply authority—a respectable exercise of power—so he invents the difficult
concept,”imperative control” (Weber 1947, p. 152). This notion captures the tone of the concept better than
authority, but still misses the idea of “subordination” found in “domination.”
3 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 1947.
4 Gerth and Mills, from Max Weber, (1946).
5 The question how to translate Herrschaft into English has been debated for some time. Mommsen (1974, p.
74) among others pointed out the difficulties of translation, but in the end he also concluded domination is the
most appropriate term.
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chapters written sometimes between 1919 and 1920, while the earlier versions
were written in 1914 or before,6 suddenly the word authority almost completely
disappears and Herrschaft is used almost exclusively.7
In order to understand why this is important we need to go back to the distinction
between Macht and Herrschaft. In the later work (1919–1920) Weber defines clearly
the difference between the two forms of exercising influence on others. As he puts it so
eloquently in the last version of the book: power (Macht) is the probability that one
actor within the social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite
resistance (Weber 2013 Band 23, p. 210). 8 Weber now has a clear definition of
Herrschaft as well: “Domination (Herrschaft) is the probability that a command …
will be obeyed.” This is about as clear as it can get. Hence Macht (power) + legitimacy
=Herrschaft (domination).
Weber’s theory of domination assumes that those subjected to domination do have
some degree of “belief” in the system. Those who obey order do so—at least to some
extent— “voluntarily.” No system of domination can sustain itself if it is just driven by
customs, personal advantage or even effectual or idealistic attachment by those subor-
dinated to authority:
… [E]very genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary com-
pliance, that is, an interest … in obedience…. [C]ustoms, personal advantage,
purely effectual or ideal motives of solidarity do not form a sufficiently reliable
basis for a given domination. In addition there is ….a further element, the belief
in legitimacy.… [E]very system attempts to establish … the belief in its legiti-
macy (Weber 1978, pp. 212–213).
Many important questions stem from this definition. For me, the crucial question is
how to interpret the notion of belief. What kind of, how strong a belief of those
subordinated to authority need there be in order to acknowledge domination as
legitimate, and who should hold such “beliefs”?
In order to appreciate Weber’s sophistication, one has to understand his claim that
the privileged groups are not actually “superior.” They merely base their claim for
obedience in the myth of their superiority. In Weber’s words: “Every highly privileged
group develops a myth of its… superiority. Under the conditions of stable distribution
of power that myth is accepted by the negatively privileged strata” (p. 953).
Hence those who obey orders typically suspect those who dominate justify their
superiority by a “myth,” therefore their belief is likely to be rather “passive.” In other
words, the “masses” (my term, not Weber’s) are unlikely to have a positive, or
affirmative belief in their masters, rulers, leaders, or bosses. They will believe that
6 Edith Hanke is uncertain how to date the first formulation, but believes it has to be dated before WWI,
MWG, Vol. 22-4, 2005, p.118.
7 Contrast MWG, Band 22-4, Teilband 4 (written in 1914 or before) and MWG, Band 23 (written in
1919/1920) where the term authority hardly appears. When in the first published version of Economy and
Society he defined Herrschaft he put behind the term Herrschaft in brackets and quotation marks “authority”
this way: Herrschaft (“Autorität”), see Weber 1978, Vol. I. p.212 or MWG 2013, Band 23, p. 449.
8 Already in the draft he wrote before the war, Weber tried to emphasize that Herrschaft implies obedience to
command: “… in our terminology domination shall be identical with authoritarian power of command”
(Weber 1978, p. 946; Weber 2005, p, 135)
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the domination imposed on them is justified since at this point in time they cannot find
a realistic alternative. I do not have to love my master, king, husband, prime minister,
CEO, Dean, department chair, or whatever: that person will exercise authority as long
as I believe this person is better than any of his or her alternatives. If the masses begin
to consider a possible alternative ruler/master the system is facing only a “legitimation
problem.”
Arguably that is a different story for the “staff.” In every complex society domina-
tion is exercised through a staff and unlike ordinary people (or the masses) the staff is
supposed to have a positive, affirmative belief in the myths that justify/legitimate
authority. If the staff loses its positive belief in the myth of domination the legitimacy
of the system may be in a crisis.
The Shah of Iran was never particularly loved by the people of Iran. They eventually
began to hear the message of Khomeini from radical Islamic preachers during the
Friday sermons and many Iranians might have believed this to be a better alternative to
the rule of the Shah. That created a legitimation problem. But the Shan only fell, when
his security apparatus abandoned him. As his staff lost faith in him the legitimation
problem turned into a legitimation crisis.
But the road from legitimation problem to legitimation crisis and eventual collapse
of the regime is certainly not a one-way street. Most Western liberal capitalist societies
faced during the 1960s a serious legitimation problem. As student movements—on rare
occasions with some support from labor—began to formulate an alternative to liberal
democratic capitalism hence the system faced a legitimation problem—especially
around 1968—but history teaches us liberal capitalism has an extraordinary capacity
to survive, not only economically, but also ideologically. Capitalist systems often
incorporate “subversive ideologies” into its own world view (for instance, affirmative
action for minorities and women and gay rights, which appeared irreconcilable with the
world views of liberal capitalism, the “bourgeois social order” before the 1960s are
reasonably acceptable now for the middle classes).
As I pointed out before the relationship between “staff” and “ruler” (by ruler I
simply mean that person/office that issues command to be obeyed), is quite critical for
Weber’ theory of history. As history unfolds or “develops”9 the relationship between
the “ruler” and the “staff” changes. Indeed in the most elementary form of social
organization (still existent in the family), namely under patriarchal authority the “ruler”
has no “staff.” In more complex forms, let’s call it prebendalism—though Weber’
terminology is not carved into stone—the staff has only rather limited claims to
appropriate the means of administration (and property). Those are at the discretion of
the ruler. In contrast under patrimonialism at least some of the means of administration
(and let’s foreshadow some of the property rights) are appropriated (though with some
limitations) by the staff. In what he calls bureaucratic or legal rational authority no
individual (neither the person in authority nor his/her staff) has the rights of coercion,
coercive rights are the monopoly of the state (but let us add: the private property rights
of all individuals and incumbency of office are secure). I elaborate more about this later
in this article.
9 Roth and Schluchter suggests that Weber has no theory of “evolution,” he rather conceived “development”
over time, see Roth and Schluchter 1979, pp. 195–206; Schluchter 1981, pp. 1–5.
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It is crucial to see: for Weber’s interpretative sociology the purpose of the concept of
legitimacy is to interpret the various ways domination was operating over human
history, to write a genealogy of human history. Much like with the theory of rationality
Weber resisted the idea to call a certain type of human action “rational” and others as
“irrational”. Nothing could have been further from Weber than to limit the uses of
legitimate order only to social organization that had existed only during the past
hundreds or 200 years, hence was “legitimated” by the rule of law or had majoritarian
approval, and to designate the rest of human history as “illegitimate.” In Weber’s theory
“irrational” action and “illegitimate” social order were marginal or exceptional cases.
The good question was not to ask: is this action rational, or is this social order
legitimate, but rather to explore what is the rationality of this action, what is the ground
of legitimacy of this order.
Let me try to give examples of illegitimate rule. Illegitimate rule for Weber means
the unsustainable system where those in command can obtain compliance only by
systematic and actual use of coercion. I put the term “actual” in bold because East
European dissidents in the 1980—who wanted to question the legitimacy of late
communist regimes—suggested they are illegitimate since they promise coercion in
cases of non-compliance though do not exercise such coercion. In my view this would
be unacceptable for Weber. All systems of domination promise coercion: even in a
democratically constituted legal-rational authority those who do not comply with the
rules/laws will be coerced. In many—if not most—countries people can even be
executed. The modern state merely “monopolizes” the power of coercion, but it can
never abandon it. Hence a system is illegitimate when those in command have to rely
actually on massive coercion, like the mid-to-late 1930 Gulag in the USSR and the
Nazi network of concentration camp during the war, arguably even the Kádár regime
between 1957 and 1963, with several hundred political prisoners being executed and
thousands imprisoned or deported. In an illegitimate system those who issue commands
use Macht, they are unable to sustain or have lost Herrschaft, hence voluntary
compliance by those subjected to their command.
In his work on legitimacyWeber also writes about “non-legitimate” types of actions/
systems, which is critically different from “illegitimate rule.” If I may use here the
Gramscian terminology, “non-legitimate authority” is similar to an emerging
“counter-hegemony.”
The prime example of non-legitimate authority is the Western city. Interestingly
enough in the German original—posthumously published text—Weber did not use the
term “non-legitimate authority” (Weber 1999, Band 22-5, p. 59). I assume the term
non-legitimate domination was added as a subtitle for Chapter XVI “The City” (Weber
1978, p. 1212) by Marianna Weber, who edited the whole work for publication.
Nevertheless the term “non-legitimate authority” (following the logic of non-rational
as distinct from irrational) is a sensible one. What is the bottom line in the manuscript
Die Stadt? My short take on this is: the city that emerges in the West has one
exceptional feature: it is an island in the ocean of traditional authority, which introduces
a new principle, the principle of Jus soli by offering Bürgertum, or “citizenship” (and
freedom from the master) for all those who spent a certain amount of time in the city. It
introduces a new principle of legitimacy—territoriality—that is not accepted as legit-
imate in the surrounding ocean of traditional authority where everyone’s identity is
decided by Jus sanguinis, by ancestry. “Stadfluft macht frei” (the city air makes you
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free) is the “non-legitimate” principle of the Western city not known in other cities of
history (Weber 1999, Band 22-5: 105). If a serf spent a relatively short period of time in
the city and swore allegiance to the city, he became its “Bürger,” or “citizen” and his
master could not reclaim him or her any longer. Non-legitimate authority implies an
embryo that begins to grow within the wombs of a previous system of domination. It is
not legitimate yet, but has a reasonable chance to become legitimate. No determination
is implied: non-legitimate authority does not necessarily become legitimate: members
of communes of the 1960 might have believed the way they live—which might have
involved promiscuity—could eventually become the norm, would become the legiti-
mate way to live. It did not happen—so far—but that does not mean it was not a
potentiality.
Let’s summarize what we have said so far: systems are legitimate if those subordi-
nated to authority accept their subordination, since they cannot define a better alterna-
tive and the staff of the person who issues commands has a firm belief that the master’s
claims (myths for his superiority) are valid. Those systems are illegitimate that have to
coerce the ones subjected to authority to obey orders; hence they have to jail, kill, and
torture masses of people in a rather unpredictable way to obtain obedience. Illegitimate
authority is unlikely to sustain itself in the long run. Legitimate order always assumes
some degree (even if a weak one) of belief and voluntariness. People obey orders from
an illegitimate authority merely if they are afraid of what will happen to them if they do
not comply; they are concerned about their life and livelihood.
The three (and the fourth) ideal types of legitimate authority
Weber makes distinction between three “ideal types of dominations/authority”: tradi-
tional, charismatic and legal/rational. Nevertheless, in a lecture delivered in Vienna in
the fall of 1917 he considered a fourth possible type of authority, and I will briefly
deliberate on this.10 The distinction between the initial three types serves dual purposes:
1) it is part of his philosophy of history. To put it brutally simple: history develops from
earlier stages. It is not “evolution,” since a) it is not inevitable, societies can be “stuck”
at earlier phases of “development,” and b) an interpretative social scientist has no way
to claim that later phases are superior to earlier stages. In addition 2) while the typology
is mainly historical it is also “trans-organizational.” Every actually existing society can
be interpreted as a mix of the three types of domination. All actually existing systems
have some elements from all three—and as I try to show: indeed four—ideal types. We
may live in a legal-rational social order, but occasionally political leaders may have
charismatic appeal and in the family—or in our universities—we may be subjected to
patriarchal authority, while fundamentally universities are governed by laws and rules.
And to continue with the fourth type of authority: we may live in a legal-rational order
where the executive is not in its place by the will of those subordinated to authority (this
is the case for instance when a king rules in a constitutional monarchy) or those who
exercise political authority may have majoritarian approval but may violate the princi-
ples of the rule of law (think of Vladimir Putin).
10 See the review of his lecture in October 25, 1917 in Neue Freie Press, reproduced in Weber 2005, Band
22-4, pp. 752–756).
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This is very much the essence of the Weberian approach. Our task is to explore the
nature of legitimacy in any society: to what extent is a society governed by
legal-rational authority? Are there some elements of charismatic or traditional authority
present in this social system? It is never either/or, the right question is: what is the
empirical mix in any particular concrete empirical case.
First, let me briefly review the three ideal types Weber presents to us in Economy
and Society and amend it with the “fourth type” at the end of this section of the article.
In this article my main task is to explore what is the mix we can find in a communist
and post-communist society and how different it is from other societies we are familiar
with. The basis of this classification is to whom obedience is due on what grounds in
the various systems of domination.
It is important to note that the ontological status of the four types of authority is not
quite the same (see Fig. 1). While traditional authority, legal rational authority, and
authority based on the “Wille der Beherrschten” are stable forms, charismatic authority
is a “revolutionary force.” Hence I begin the discussion with a brief review of the type
of domination with traditional authority (Fig. 2).
Traditional authority
Let us begin with Weber’s mature definition of traditional authority:
1) “Legitimacy is claimed for and believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules
…” (p. 226).
2) “The masters are designated according to traditional rule and are obeyed because
of their “Eigenwürde” (traditional status)” (p. 226).
3) “This … rule is … primarily based on personal loyalty” (p. 227).
4) “The person exercising authority is not a superior, but a “personal master” (p. 227).
5) “Obedience is owed not to enacted rules, but to the person …” (p. 227) 11
(emphases are mine).
Obedience is due to 
     Law/pre-established rules     Personal master 
    3/Legal raonal authority 
            Designated by tradion    Based on personal charisma 
          1/ Traditional authority    2/ Charismac authority     
4/ to a ruler who was selected by “Wille der Beherrschten” 
Fig. 1 Obedience and four types of authority
11 All citations are from Weber 1978.
Theor Soc (2016) 45:1–24 7
This seems to be clear enough as an attempt to describe “pre-modern” or “tradition-
al” societies. Weber goes a great deal further and characterizes various types/phases—
given his dedication to “developmentalism.” I try to avoid terms like “stages” in
discussing traditional authority.
Charismatic authority
Not much remains to be said about the second, transitional form of authority:
charismatic domination. Its nature is straight forward and it is quite obvious that in
some form or degree the charismatic domination concept is applicable not only to
archaic societies, but to the world of the twentieth or twenty-first centuries. Weber’s
definition is clear:
The term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a certain quality of an individual person-
ality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed
with supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional powers or qualities. These
… are not accessible to the ordinary person, but regarded as of divine origin or as
exemplary … (p. 241) (emphases are mine).
People who subject themselves to charismatic authority consider that person “ex-
traordinary” (almost superhuman, or divine), so charisma is not an innate characteristic
of individuals, but it is attributed to them by the followers. But why would they do this?
Why would they consider another ordinary person as extraordinary, divine, or exem-
plary? Weber has a good answer. People “create” charismatic leaders in times of great
transformation and crises, when there is a great need for a leader who can deliver
miracles and resolve the problems that look almost unresolvable. A Charismatic leader
offers hope for the hopeless, promises paradise on Earth. And when they cannot
deliver? They lose their charisma:
“If proof and success elude the leader for long… it is likely that his charismatic
authority will disappear” (p. 242) (emphases are mine).
“[The charismatic leader gains and retains his authority] … solely by
proving his powers in practice. He must work miracles…. If the people
Types of tradional authority 
Without staﬀ                    With staﬀ 
 1/Patriarchy       
Staﬀ receives beneﬁce    Staﬀ receives ﬁef 
    3/Patrimonialism 2/Prebendalism
Insecure property   Secure, but unalienable property19
Fig. 2 Types of traditional authority
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withdraw their recognition, the master becomes a mere private person …”
(pp. 1114–1115).
No wonder, charisma is the “revolutionary force”:
“In traditionalist periods, charisma is the great revolutionary force …” (p. 245).
“[B]ureaucratic rationalization, too, often has been a major revolutionary force.…
But it revolutionizes with technical means … “from without” … Charismatic
belief revolutionizes men ‘from within’ …” (pp. 1116).
“In pre-rationalistic periods, tradition and charisma between them have almost
exhausted the whole of orientation of action” (p. 245).12
Charisma hence is in the “eye of the beholder,” not a characteristic of the person who
is regarded to be charismatic. The term is borrowed from theology13 and indeed the
“pure types” of charismatic leaders are the founders of great religious movements.
Nevertheless there are leaders who strive for and acquire the status of being “charis-
matic” even in modernity or even under legal-rational authority. Weber considered
exceptional individuals in sciences or art to be “charismatic.” The question whether
they carry “real charisma” or they are pseudo charismatic leaders or they just carry
“fake” charisma is debated.. 14 I take an eclectic position here—Weber’s theory of
charisma is an ideal type; it does not actually exist in pure form therefore it is
reasonable to look for signs of charisma in non-traditional settings as well.
It should be crystal clear: charisma is the type of domination that is
transitory; basically it is between one of the forms of traditional authority and
another form of traditional authority. Hence it is hard or impossible to pass
charisma on from one leader to the next. Arguably one exception is the Roman
Catholic Church, but transmission of charisma is rather difficult even in the
Church. When one charismatic leader lost his or her charisma or the leader
passed away, it is likely that a certain kind of traditional authority will replace
that leader. On rare occasions charismatic authority may be turned into
legal-rational authority.
Legal-rational authority
At first glance it appears to be simple and clear what legal-rational domination is and
only as we dig deeper do we see that it is a little more complicated.
12 All citations from Weber 1978.
13 The term was borrowed by Weber from Rudolph Sohm, and from his two volume book on Kirchenrecht,
(1982).
14 There is a large literature on this subject. Edward Shills in his (1965) “Charisma, Order and Status” takes off
from Weber and tries to adopt it as a broader concept to be applicable to modernity—one may say even to the
mundane word; others took a different direction and suggested in modernity charisma can be abused, faked,
as, for example, by what Hitler or Stalin did, or it can be abused for commercial purposes, see Bensman and
Givant 1975; more recently Costa Pinto et al. 2007
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So how is “obedience” attained under this form?
i. “… person in authority, the “superior,” is himself subject to an impersonal order…
ii. … the person who obeys authority … obeys only the law …
iii. … members do not owe obedience to [superior] as an individual, but to the
impersonal order …” (pp. 217–128) (all emphases are mine).15
What is clear that obedience is not due to a personal master but to pre-established
laws and rules and the person in authority is subject to the same laws and rules as
anyone else. Hence it is legal rather than personal authority. What makes it rational?
The fact that it allows rational calculation: the rules have to be pre-established, they
cannot change at the discretion of the person in authority and it would follow that
legislation can never be retroactive (that would make rational calculation impossible).
Rational calculation is critical for Weber: he goes on at great length to explain why
traditional or charismatic authority is inconsistent with modern market capitalism. So
traditional authority is not conducive to capitalist development, because:
“[T]he general character of the administrative practices [of traditional authority] …
restrict the development of rational economic activity … [in the following ways]:
1) Traditionalism places … obstacles in the way of formally rational regulations,
which can depended upon to remain stable and hence calculable …
2) A staff …with formal technical training … is typically absent.
3) There is a wide scope for actual arbitrariness …
4) [It had] an inherent tendency to regulate economic activity in terms of utilitarian,
welfare or absolute value” (pp. 239–240) (emphasis is mine).
Charismatic authority is not conducive to capitalist development either. It is actually
“anti-economic force”:
Since it is ‘extraordinary,’ charismatic authority is sharply opposed to rational and
particularly bureaucratic authority.… Bureaucratic authority is… rational… [by] being
bound to intellectually analyzable rules; while charismatic authority is specifically
irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules” (p. 244)…. [C]harismatic
want-satisfaction is a typical anti-economic force … [it constitutes] an irregular,
unsystematic acquisitive act (p. 245) (all emphases are mine).
Hence the only form of domination what is consistent with the requirement of
market capitalism is legal-rational authority. It actually could be called a system of
“liberalism.”But what is the relationship between liberalism and democracy? Weber
was called by Mommsen a “liberal in despair.” He does not have a clear answer. What
matters is that this is a system of rule of law and regulations, which apply equally to all
members including the persons in authority. But where do the laws or rules come from?
Weber as late as in 1920 does not have a definite answer to this question:
“Legal authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of the following … ideas:
1. …. norms [laws] may be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of
expediency or value rationality or both …
15 All citations are from Weber 1978.
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2. …. law … [is] … a consistent system of abstract rules which … [was] …
intentionally established …” (p. 217)16 (all emphases are mine).
Hence rules or laws can be established by “imposition” or they can be attained by
agreement, though Weber is silent with regard to by whom and how such an agreement
has to be reached.
To conclude: legal-rational authority MAY be a democratic polity or it may not. The
question that haunted political science since the seventeenth century, since Hobbes and
Locke (namely the question: who is the source of law?) is not addressed in Weber’s
typology of domination. For him the critical question is: what is the most suitable
political system for capitalist development? It has to be liberal, but—by implication—it
does not have to be necessarily democratic. Liberal autocratic or authoritarian regimes
have a reasonable record in achieving capitalistic aims. Or do they have to turn
eventually to democracy? Is the future of China liberal democracy? We can have a
strong political commitment to such a project, but as social scientists: we do not know.
Some political theorists have argued (contested by others) democracy is by far the best
shell of capitalism (as Lenin put it17), it was actually achieved by the anti-capitalist
struggles of the working class, which forced capitalists to political compromises, such
as the welfare state and universal suffrage. Whether capitalism needs democracy or not,
whether democracy was forced upon capital by labor or it also the most efficient
political tool for private gains: Weber is agnostic. But he is certain: there is no capitalist
economy without liberalism. This liberalism implies: rule and stability of laws (and
inevitably a separation of executive power from legislative power, no matter how
legislative bodies are constituted), equality before the law (what requires an indepen-
dent judiciary) and security of private property rights. Weber is not as specific about
these issues as I am now, but this all logically follows from his theory.
The fourth type of domination
But the question of how liberalism is related to democracy—nevertheless was on
Weber’s mind and this is why in 1917 in his lecture in Vienna he considers a fourth
type of domination. (This is rarely noticed in scholarship on Weber18). The Neue Freie
Press reports on his October 1917 lecture in Vienna this way: “Schließlich ging er
[meaning the lecturer, hence Max Weber] zu der Darlegung über, wie die modern
Entwicklung der okzidentalen Staatswesen durch das allmähliche Entstehen eines
vierten Legitimationsgendankens charakterisiert war, derjenigen Herrschaft, welche
wenigstens offiziell ihre eigene Legitimität aus dem Willen der Beherrschten ableitet”
(Weber 2005, Band 22-4, p. 755, my emphasis). Wow. What a sentence! Unlike in his
theory of legal-rational authority now legitimacy may stem from the “will” of the
people. But Weber cannot help: he is a liberal in despair. After all these people are the
16 All citations are from Weber 1978.
17 Lenin, V.I. [1917’] 1993. State and Revolution, Chapter 1, in V.I. Lenin. Collected Works. Vol. 25 Lenin
Institute Archive, pp. 381–492
18 Edith Hanke mentions this in her Introduction toMWG, Vol. 24-4, 2005 (p. 86–87), but without elaborating
on it. See also pp. 745–46. I could not find any secondary scholarly literature on this subject.
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“Beherrschten” (they are subjected to domination), the resulting system is still a system
of “Herrschaft” rather than the realm of freedom and on top of this is “wenigstens
offiziell” (at least officially) the ground for the fourth type of legitimacy. To conclude:
Weber takes no stand about the question what is the best “shell” for capitalism: liberal
autocracy or liberal democracy.
In my reading, the fourth system of legitimation is a somewhat ironic
definition of democratic legitimacy (after all this is the will of those “subjected
to authority, not the will of “free citizens”—hence this is a kind of foucauldian
ironic comment about what “will” can be). Nevertheless this is articulated
before the collapse of the German largely illiberal monarchical autocracy and
before the Weimar experiment with liberal democracy. Let me also add: Weber
speaks about “will of those subordinated to authority” before he can see the
illiberal autocracy that will emerge as a result of the communist revolution in
Russia, hence on October 1917 he might have hoped that in post-revolutionary
Russia and post-imperial Germany liberal “democracy” might emerge.
It is telling though that when in 1919–1920 Weber re-writes his theory of
legitimacy the “fourth type of legitimacy” disappears. Given the mess that the
November 7, 1917 revolution in Russia produced and chaotic nature of the
Weimar Republic, Weber—probably wrongly—expected the solution would
come from Charismatic leaders, rather than “Wille der Beherrschten.” What a
tragic mistake: charismatic leadership led to disasters, while at least after the
Second World War in the Euro-Atlantic region the dominant form of domina-
tion became “liberal democracy,” hence a combination of legal-rational author-
ity with “Wille der Beherrschten.” This arguably is not a perfect, but still the
best system of governance—to put it as Churchill did—that humankind has
invented so far.
Various types of traditional authority
Let us return to the various types of “traditional authority.” This is important
for this article. As I pointed out before Weber’ distinction among the various
types of authority has two purposes: 1/ it aims to offer a typology of social
formation over time. In a way it is a substitute for what Marx offered as a
history of “modes of production;” 2/ but at the same time it can be used also
as an analytic tool to dissect the ways domination operates in any social
formation, including “modern” societies. While “modern” societies are primarily
legal-rational authorities they may maintain some traditional elements. It is
rather uncontroversial to suggest that patriarchal authority exists in “modern
societies,” even under legal-rational authority. Nevertheless the most provoca-
tive hypothesis of this article is to claim that other forms of traditional
authority, such as prebendalism or patrimonialism may co-exist with a usually
deformed system of legal-rational and democratic authority (hence with the
“Wille der Beherschten”).
Now let me turn to the four “pure” types of traditional authority: patriarchy,
Sultanism, prebendalism, and patrimonialism. Then I offer a hypothesis as to how
these types can be applicable to the analysis of contemporary societies.
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Types of traditional authority
1/ Patriarchy
The concept of patriarchy is fairly simple:
[Patriarchalism is] “… the most elementary form of traditional domination where
the master has no personal administrative staff.” 19
“… The decisive characteristic [of Patriarchalism] is the belief of the members
that domination, even though it is an inherent traditional right of the master, must
definitely be exercised as a joint right… of all members. Hence the master is still
largely dependent on the willingness of the members to comply with his or-
ders…. Therefore the members (Genossen) are not yet really subjects
(Untertanen).”20
This sounds like a good description of tribal societies or, incidentally, the
families we happened to live in. And indeed he elaborates it further to make sure
it is clear enough the elementary form of patriarchy can be understood as
“domestic authority”:
“[Under] … elementary Patriarchalism…the patriarch’s authority carries strict
obligations to obedience only within his own household.… [I]t has only exem-
plary effect… or must resort to advice or similar means of influence.” 21 This is a
sort of “domestic authority (my emphasis)… [Taking its point of departure from]
… the belief in authority [that] is based on personal relations that are perceived as
natural. This belief is rooted in filial piety…. The woman is dependent
because of the normal superiority … of the male.… Paternal power … [is]
not primarily based on actual blood relations.… [It] is … power of dispo-
sition over property even after the … recognition that procreation and birth
are connected.” 22
Patriarchy is not merely an “archaic” form from the distant past, the concept—much
like almost all other concepts of Weber—is equally applicable for historical analysis or
the analysis of contemporary institutional arrangements.
The other forms of traditional authority operate with a staff. He distinguishes
three types of traditional domination with staff. His terminology can be some-
what confusing (especially his uses of the term “patrimonialism,” which often
means all three types, by distinguishing primary patrimonialism from patrimonial
state and the prebendal form of patrimonialism based on benefices, rather than
fief. Let me offer the following simplification of Weber’s complex analysis of the
19 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p.231.
20 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p.231.
21 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p. 231.
22 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p. 1007.
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three forms of traditional domination. I hope this will bring some clarity in the
conceptualization:
2/ Sultanism (a pure case of prebendalism)
In some cases the members of administrative staff “are purely personal instruments
of the master.… [When authority] operates primarily on the basis of discretion [of the
ruler], it will be called Sultanism…. Sometimes it appears that Sultanism is completely
unrestrained by tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element
is not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but consists in an extreme develop-
ment of the ruler’s discretion.” 23 Under this system the staff possesses the means of
administration at the grace of the master and has no security of property rights. Property
is not inherited, cannot be alienated, and can be reallocated at any moment at the
unilateral decision of the ruler.
Prebendalism is narrowly defined. Under prebendalism the staff appropriates the
means of administration of material property only partially. The staff (vassals) receive
benefices:
“We shall speak of benefices insofar as the forms of maintenance … are always
newly granted in a traditional fashion … they can be appropriated by the
individual, although not in hereditary fashion…. When an administrative staff
is … supported … in this form, we shall speak of prebendalism” 24 (my
emphases).
While Sultanism offers no security whatsoever, under prebendalism the incumbent
of the office can expect to remain in office and retain property as long as he or she
assures the master of loyalty and offers valuable services to the master.
3/ Patrimonialism (“feudalism,” vassal compensated by fief)
“Under patrimonial authority… the administrative staff appropriates particular pow-
ers.… Domination of estate type thus involves (i)… limitation of the lord’s discretion in
selecting his administrative staff and (ii)… often… appropriation by… staff of α) the
positions… β) the material means of administration… γ) the governing power.” 25
How the “material means of administration” are appropriated is crucial. Under
patrimonial rule narrowly defined, the staff is rewarded by “fief”: “[T]he fief is the
vassal’s personal property for the duration of the feudatory relationship, however, it
remains inalienable, since it is intended to preserve the vassal’s service capacity.”26 The
property that has been granted as “fief” typically can even be inherited; hence
patrimonialism with fief offers quite secure property rights (and also security of office).
In patrimonialism, both office and property is relatively secure, though the rights of
23 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p. 231–232. See, for contemporary applications, Chehabi and
Linz 1998.
24 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p.235.
25 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p.232
26 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 1978, p.1074
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disposal with property by comparison to private property are still limited. Property is
usually inalienable; it usually cannot even be mortgaged. It is only given in order to
preserve the vassal’s capacity to serve.
Historically speaking Sultanism was the form of domination characteristic of the
Ottoman Empire. The best approximation of prebendalism in the modern Western
world is the Russian service nobility (or Pomeshchiki). The ideal type of
patrimonialism is West European feudalism. In Russia, boyars owned property and
office in a patrimonial way and they were turned into a service nobility after centuries
of struggle by Czars from Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great. In the following sections,
I demonstrate the applicability of the concepts of patrimonialism and prebendalism to
post-communist capitalisms.
Types of legitimation under communism and post-communism
My main aim now is to pose the question: were communist and are post-communist
social orders legitimate and, if so, what is the foundation of their legitimacy?
1/ Can one ever call a communist regime legitimate? If so what kind of legitimation
regimes describes such communist rule?
I start this with a brief reference to the question: were communist societies’
legitimate orders at all? From the point of view of liberal democracy, it would be easy
to dismiss communist societies as “illegitimate,” but such a position could be hardly
attributed to Weber. If we can find instances of communist social order where there is
sufficient “voluntary compliance” by the “Beherrschten,”Weber would not hesitate to
see that order as legitimate and will ask the question what is the foundation of this
legitimacy.
In some communist regimes there was not much “voluntary compliance” and order
was maintained by systematic coercion. The most extreme example being Cambodia
under Pol Pot (though Pol Pot before he became the supreme leader of Cambodia was
seen by many as a charismatic figure, see David Chandler 1999) and arguably certain
epochs of Stalinism and Maoism were illegitimate, despotic.
But there are long epochs of communism when order was maintained without
coercion, where some kind of communist Herrschaft was established. But what kind
of Herrschaft? Commentators gave various answers. Some communist leaders at least
at certain points in time established a charismatic order (most eminent example would
be Fidel Castro, but arguably Lenin and following him for certain epochs even figures
such as Stalin could establish themselves as charismatic leaders. The same can be
argued for Mao). Whether that was real charisma or just pseudo-charisma can be
debated (Bensman and Givant 1975). Some described communism as traditional
(Heller et al. 1983) or neo-traditional authority (Andrew Walder 1988), Fehér and
Rigby (1992) coined the intriguing term “goal rational authority.”
All these theories offer insights and are useful tools to explore empirically various
cases at various points in the history of communist societies. Arguably some commu-
nist orders had a strong charismatic appeal. The propaganda machine, the “personality
cult” obviously was important in manufacturing such charisma, in generating
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enthusiasm and dedication to the leaders who promised to deliver “miracles” through
“revolutionary change.”
As the leaders failed to deliver miracles or passed away, the system faced the
difficult task of institutionalizing charisma or passing it on to another leader. Some
communist systems degenerated into illegitimate system, using massive, systemic
coercion (as arguably happened in Cambodia, or during the mid-1930s in the USSR,
possibly during the Great Leap Forward or Cultural Revolution in China). On some
occasions successors made a bid for carrying on the charisma of the predecessor. The
best example may be Stalin during the 1920s, when he faked a “last will” of Lenin that
supposedly appointed Stalin as successor. He put the propaganda machine into oper-
ation and created a personality cult around himself that did deliver some degree of
charisma to the young Stalin. Nevertheless, usually after the passing of the original
charismatic leader, communist societies struggled for some other type of legitimacy. In
some cases, it is indeed an attempt to create some version of a rather classical traditional
authority: such is the establishment of the Kim dynasty in North Korea or an attempt to
create some neo-traditional authority, based on elaborate patron-client relationships. In
this case, the rulers tried to legitimate the system by claims that the party leadership or
the individual leader of the party take better care of things than anybody else could.
There were also attempts, and for a while rather successful ones, to claim that
communist order—in contrast with the “instrumental rationality, or irrationality of the
market”—offers a higher level of legitimacy. The communist system, according to this
claim, was based on rationality of the goals rather than rationality of means. Commu-
nism in other word is “substantive rationality,” compared to market capitalism, which is
an inferior type of rationality—it is only formal rationality. Rigby and Fehér formulated
it this way originally, but in The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power we also tried
to conceptualize the legitimacy of the post-Stalinist USSR and Central Europe in
similar terms. “Rational redistributors” claim legitimacy referring to their monopoly
on “teleological knowledge” (Konrad and Szelenyi 1979).
Hence the investigation of the kind of legitimacy (or illegitimacy) required histor-
ically specific empirical investigation. Actually existing socialist societies combined
various elements of all of Weberian ideal types. In a concluding remark on the subject,
let me make a provocative statement. Communism appeared to be the opposite of
legal-rational authority, by its own aspiration the essence of the Marxian project was to
overcome the instrumental formal rationality of market capitalism, the “anarchy of the
market.” Nevertheless, there were elements of legal-rational authority in most phases
and forms of communisms. Communist societies felt obliged to draft constitutions.
Curiously, often they pretended they operated under the “rule of law”: they tortured
prisoners, in the worse times, to confess to crimes punishable by laws, though everyone
knew they never committed those crimes. Unlike the Nazis who usually just shot
enemies, or sent them to gas chambers and did not bother with complicated legal
procedures Stalinism, even at times when it arguably was illegitimate, created “show
trials.” The best known was the trial against Bukharin. Unlike the Jesuit inquisitors who
probably mostly believed the accused had actually committed crimes and who tortured
the prisoners to “find the truth,” Stalinist prosecutors typically knew the prisoners were
innocent, so they tortured them to confess invented crimes that could “justify” the
prisoners being executed, since execution was what the law prescribed for the
confessed crime.
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During the despotic rule of Stalin, this was mainly “fake legal-rational authority,”
people often were murdered without any legal procedure. It is hard to detect any
element of legal-rationality, or rule of law under Maoism, especially during the Cultural
Revolution. During that time Maoists prosecuted enemies in a way similar to the Nazis.
But all communists systems were by definition “illiberal” (hence never genuinely
legal-rational). Under post-Stalinist reform communism, the legal-rational component
was strengthened, but no communist regime was either liberal or democratic in any
meaningful sense of those terms. Those in authority may have been formally elected by
some body, but de facto they were appointed as members of the “nomenclature” under
the control of the executive, be it the Central Committee, the Politburo, or some lower
level party organization. None of these systems subscribed to any of the key principles
of liberalism: separation of legislative, executive, and juridical power, and security/
sanctity of individual property rights. But it is sensible to suggest that such “fake”
legal-rational authority was complementing legitimation beyond charisma, traditional
authority, or goal rationality, especially in the reform communist epoch.
And now we are ready to face the question of legitimacy under post-communist
regimes. Typically, though there are some substantial country-by-country variations, the
first stage of transition from communism to post-communism was a transition from some
sort of traditional/neo-traditional/goal rational authority to legal rational authority com-
bined with the “fourth system of legitimation”—hence with a system that is legitimated by
the “Wille der Beherrschten,” hence it was at least to some extent democratic.
2/ Early democracy/liberalism. Legal rational authority in Central Europe (with a
patrimonial twist)
Between 1989 and 1991 in most of the formerly socialist countries of Central Europe
and in some of the countries of the former USSR, in the Baltic States, and even in Russia,
desperate efforts were made to turn these states into liberal democracies with neo-liberal
capitalist institutions. Half-hearted reforms were implemented at least during the first few
years in war- torn Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and the
Caucasian republics. Belorussia, the Central Asian former Soviet republics, and certainly
the Asian former or still socialist countries, like China and Vietnam are even clearer
cases, where no liberal democratic reform took place. But in Central Europe and the
Baltic states arguably the dominant form of legitimation was indeed legal rational
authority (liberalism) with some form of a democratic polity. The rule of law was
accepted, the legislative, executive and juridical powers and the media became reason-
ably separated from each other. Security of private ownership was acknowledged by the
law. Reasonably free multi-party elections were held to constitute the legislative branch.
The most critical challenge all these societies faced in the early years was the
conversion of public property into private wealth. According to the neo-liberal doctrine,
all problems of transition from a redistributive to market economics will be resolved as
soon as identifiable private owners are found for the public assets.
The purpose was to “close the commons” in 500 days (as the Russians tried to do it)
or in 5 to 10 years, as the Central European countries attempted. That was difficult or
impossible to achieve with purely legal-rational and democratic means. In the demo-
cratically elected legislatures, elections were free; there was multi-party competition;
but voter turn-out was underwhelming, hence the newly elected governments had a
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somewhat questionable democratic legitimacy. During the electoral campaigns,
ideological issues were more often discussed than the crucial question of who
will become the private proprietor of assets formerly under public ownership and
what will happen with the welfare state.27 Hence during the early 1990s liberal
democracy, even in the countries that were the closest to the “ideal type,” like
the Czech Republic and Hungary, there was an inevitable patrimonial component
in the system of domination. The privatization legislations—especially those that
relied heavily on vouchers—gave a great deal of discretion to the executive
branch. In countries that tried to use citizenship vouchers, like in the
Czech Republic or Russia, or compensation vouchers, like in Hungary, still
needed massively subsidized government credits or grossly undervalued property
prices to obtain ownership of large corporations without market-tested creditwor-
thiness. So who was creditworthy was decided by an official in governmental
and semi-governmental agencies or by banks—in every case through “personal
networks.” Even when public property was put up for “auction” and the bidders
were international, multi-national firms the buyers needed inside information
about the “real value” of the firms up for sale. This again could be obtained
by privatization agencies or management of those firms but there was just no
way to accomplish this by purely market means. And that deviation from
legal-rational authority is what I propose calling a secondary “patrimonial prin-
ciple” of legitimation.
In the most post-communist liberal-democratic regimes this happened by
offering special privileged to management or former knowledgeable and trusted
government-party officials. Such a patrimonial element was the weakest in
Central Europe. The emergent Central European post-communist capitalism
basically could have been described with a legal-rational authority, which
operated within a reasonably democratic institution. They were as close to
“liberal democracy” as one could expect in societies with making a fast
transition from communism to liberal capitalism. Nevertheless many commen-
tators tend to over-idealize the 1990s in Central Europe. In comparison with
communism, of course, there was a great leap forward to separation of powers,
freedom of the media, the “fourth branch of power,” and recognition of the
legitimacy of private ownership. In most countries there were reasonably free,
multi-party elections. The most vulnerable component of this liberal-democracy
was the legitimacy of private ownership and the usually miserable voter turnout
at elections. The notions of “theft,” and “corruption” were attached to the
emergent new private property of the nomenclature-bourgeoisie from day one.
Hence private ownership was not as legitimate as one would have hoped. Bálint
Magyar coined the term “mafia-state” much later (Magyar 2013), but many
ordinary people in Central Europe thought about their new rich as Mafiosi
anyway from the very early days of the transition. The separation of power,
especially the independence of public media from the government, was also
challenged from day one. With this somewhat skeptical note I do accept the
27 See Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1991, and Szelenyi et al 1996.
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fundamentally legal-rational authority and democratic nature of most Central
European countries.
3/ Patrimonialism in Russia during the first decade of transition (with some elements
of legal-rational authority)
Russia started to diverge from this trajectory very early on. Already in 1998
(Eyal et al 1998), I called Russia “capitalism from above,” a sort of patrimonial
order. There may be many reasons for this divergence. Russia has long historical
experience with autocratic governments. In addition the new post-communist
elites were often recruited from Soviet nomenclature—it was a nomenclature-bourgeoisie.
Yeltsin clashed with legal-rational-authority and democratic policy early on. His
stated aim was to establish capitalism in Russia in 500 days and the mechanism
to achieve this was supposed to be voucher privatization, namely to give a fair
share of Russia’s “commons” in “vouchers” to every citizen and create millions
of owners rather than a few millionaires. But this did not work. Ordinary
Russians of course did not know what to do with their vouchers. They were
starving, so they sold their vouchers under value to investors/speculators who
used them in privatization. What happened next was a classic case of
patrimonialism. Yeltsin, the new “czar” had to decide who among the bidders,
all with little capital and no credit rating, would acquire the property. He often
relied on the advice is his beloved daughter, Tatyana, and she picked the “best
people” for the “job.” Yeltsin in this way appointed the new grand bourgeoisie.
There were “auctions” where property was transformed from public to private,
but the Yeltsin regime grossly manipulated these auctions. With these manipu-
lations Yeltsin and his inner circle made sure the people who were defined as
“good people” by Tatyana became the new owners (for a colorful and persua-
sive description of these practices, see Klebnikov 2000). I call the first decade
of Russian transition from communism a patrimonial (with some legal-rational
components) regime since property was allocated by the “grace” of the ruler.
The executive branch had a great deal of autonomy to decide who the new
owners would be. The aim of such patrimonial rule, within the framework of a
democratic system, was to create a grand bourgeoisie that could be expected to
be reasonably loyal to political powers. When the chips were falling, it did
work. In 1996 Yeltsin faced re-election as president and he was running behind
Zyuganov, the candidate of the Communist Party. The new grand bourgeoisie,
the seven largest financiers with the leadership of Berezovsky rallied behind
Yeltsin. They hated his opponent, Zyuganov, even more than Yeltsin and since
they controlled the media they played a critical role in Yeltsin’s re-election.
Incidentally the BIG SEVEN claimed just 5 years after the collapse of the
USSR that they owned half of the wealth in Russia!
So I call Russia under Yeltsin a patrimonial system. Yeltsin on a few occa-
sions tried to challenge the powers of the new grand bourgeoisie. He had an
intense conflict for instance with Gusinsky, but Yeltsin eventually backed down
(for the story, see again Klebnikov 2000). Let me just summarize: Russia under
Yeltsin was a patrimonial order (property was allocated by the political ruler, but
with relatively secure property rights) with some legal-rational authority. It was
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not quite a liberal system, while private property was defended by law, Yeltsin
sent tanks against the legislature, when they went against his will. He operated a
somewhat managed democratic system. Elections with stakes were held, but the
media was controlled by Yeltsin friendly private owners, so it was hardly a “free
media”. In contrast most Central –European countries were liberal, legal rational
authorities, property was allocated by market mechanism (with some patrimonial
management though), with substantial separation of powers. A struggle to bring
the media under the control of the executive started very early. This was mostly
unsuccessful. Elections were free and to the extent the messy campaign financing
law allowed it quite fair, but democracies were not “consolidated.” It took a long
time for parties which can rotate in power were formed and this process is still
under way in every Central European post-communist country.
Putin’s revolution: a turn to prebendalism with illiberal managed
democracy
The key characteristics of Putinism
Putin’s raise to power represented a major shift in the system of legitimation in
post-communist Russia. By the end of the Yeltsin’s years, the new Russian grand
bourgeoisie began to “privatize” the state itself; big money wanted political
power. For a while Berezovsky was national security adviser to Yeltsin. For
Putin, an ambitious, energetic, able, young, former KGB man, this was totally
unacceptable. He wanted to bring big money under political control, to put a
leash on the new grand bourgeoisie. He put the new rich under a loyalty test:
those who pass the test can stay and get richer, those who fail have an option to
emigrate to London or Tel Aviv, or end up in jail in Siberia. The smart ones, like
Berezovsky or Gusinsky went to Sheremetyevo airport; the overly ambitious
ones, like Khodorkovsky ended up in long jail terms in Siberia. Those who
gave up political ambitions and swore loyalty to the new “czar” became “serving
nobility” (like Abramovich and Deripaska). They could stay on and become even
richer. Even the fact that they belonged to the Yeltsin “family” was forgotten.
But what mechanism is used to redistribute property already allocated? I would call
it the process of selective criminalization. No enemies are prosecuted on political, on
ideological grounds: they all are accused of having committed economic crimes, such
as tax evasion or corruption. Khodorkovsky was not jailed since he had political
ambitions, but because he was found guilty money laundering…. Since the enclosure
of the commons took place so fast and usually in a legal vacuum, virtually everyone
who is in the class of the nouveau riche has skeletons in his or her closet. Hence the
only question is who controls the prosecuting authority and what skeleton the prose-
cutor will find in whose closet. This is why I call the system selective criminalization.
Those who are found guilty are probably guilty all right, but who is not? The question
of who will hold private property was still decided by the political authority, but
property rights became less secure. To put it in Weber’s terms, “fief” was transformed
into “benefices”, the boyars of Yeltsin became the Pomeshchiki of Putin. The Russian
system of legitimation shifted from patrimonialism to prebendalism. Intriguingly this
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was driven by the apparently democratic nature of policy and the inevitable shift to
illiberalism in the system of legitimation.
Even in Putin’s Russia, the claim that the system is based on majoritarian rule
remains important. The regime needs legitimacy in reasonably free and somewhat fair
multi-party elections. Those in positions of authority have to win those elections so
they need a constituency that will support them. Big money is an important constitu-
ency. But how to create or sustain a loyal big money constituency once all the public
property was privatized, all the “commons were enclosed?” Since the property that
could be used to create or sustain loyal followers was already allocated during the
Yeltsin’s years, the only way to keep the system going required that property already
allocated be redistributed from the non-loyal ones to those Putin hoped would be loyal.
This cannot be achieved in a liberal, legal-rational system of authority where
property right are secure, the powers of the executive are checked by the legislature
and judiciary, and the media are free. The redistribution of property from the first
generation of owners, from the boyars to the Pomeshchiki and the corresponding
softening of property rights, requires a strengthening of executive power. This can
only be achieved with the limitations of powers of the judiciary, legislative powers and
the reduction of the independence of the media, hence a shift from legal-rational
authority to an illiberal system of powers. It is important to notice the irony of this
process: the shift to the prebendal system of illiberal order is driven by the pressure on
those who rule to legitimate themselves with the majoritarian principle, hence by their
desires to win elections, which at least appears to be free and fair.
This democratic process under Putin is substantially “managed.” It needs to retain
the appearance of multi-party democracy. As Perry Anderson (2007) noted, such an
illiberal democracy—my term not Anderson’s—requires “opposition” parties. Hence it
is conceivable that in Putin’s Russia the Communist Party is kept alive by Putin
himself. At some point such a management goes “too” far and turns managed democ-
racy into autocracy, if there is a chance that at elections the ruling party could lose
power. Putin created his own party, the United Russia, in 2001 that has dominated the
legislature, the Duma, ever since. It won a super majority, which enabled the Duma to
change even the constitution in 2007. In 2011, however, it received merely 51 % of the
votes. Would he continue electoral democracy once he faces loss or would he turn his
system into an autocracy, with no elections or a Soviet type of fake elections where he
would again win 99 % of the votes?
Re-convergence of Russian and Central European ways: the move away from
liberalism, toward manage democracy and prebendalism in Central Europe. Is China
heading in this direction?
Arguably the Putin “virus” is in the system in most if not in all of the Central
European systems. Structurally this stems from the system that operates in a democratic
framework, where elections at least have to appear to be competitive and fair. Since the
“commons were already enclosed,” the only mechanism to “buy” votes is through a
redistribution of property already allocated.
Undoubtedly Hungary is the vanguard in “Putinization” of post-communism. The
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, astutely called the system he is trying to
establish in Hungary “illiberal democracy.” I only would add the term “managed” to
this, the best description of the emergent system of legitimation in Hungary is “man-
aged illiberal democracy.”
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Much like United Russia in 2007, the Hungarian ruling party, FIDESZ, achieved a
supermajority in parliament in 2010. Having the powers to change the constitution, it
passed a new constitution. It can change the composition and rights of the constitutional
courts—did both—and manage the electoral system for its advantages. For my argu-
ment though, the most important development is the “softening” of property rights. Mr.
Orbán’s party was briefly in government between 1998 and 2002. When they lost in a
close electoral competition, Mr. Orbán acknowledged one mistake he made while
prime minister: he did not create his own bourgeoisie. This is a mistake one does not
make twice. As he won election comfortably in 2010 and 2014, he made an effort to
create and maintain a loyal base and its core had to be a propertied bourgeoisie. During
the second term of the FIDESZ government (2010–2014), he reallocated petty property
rights. A smart move was to create a retail trade monopoly for tobacco shops. Small
grocery stores and gas stations made a great deal of their profits from selling tobacco:
now only special stores with tobacco licenses had the monopoly of tobacco retail trade.
Obtaining such a license did not make anybody into a billionaire but it was a source of
nice profit, so one could anticipate that the recipients of such licenses would reward the
ruling party by voting for them and they in fact did so in 2014.
After FIDESZ won the 2014 elections in a rather “managed way” with a new
qualified, two-thirds majority, it went one step further and is trying now to put big
money “on the leash.” As the prime minister said, no tree can grow into the skies. Now
the attempt is to limit the power of a few oligarchs and replace them with a whole set of
smaller and presumably more loyal oligarchs. This is the classical example what I call
prebendalism, the making of a class of “serving nobility.” In two by-elections in 2015,
FIDESZ lost its two-thirds majority and therefore somewhat limits its illiberal ambi-
tions. The government, for instance, cannot any longer change the electoral rules or the
power of the presidency, but it still has absolute majority, so in most legislation the
parliament is still just rubber stamping the will of the executive branch.
What we see emerging in post-communism is a novel combination of legal-rational
authority operating with a rather or even excessively managed democratic framework
combined with some aspects of patrimonialism and, more recently, prebendalism.
Let me be as clear as I can: I am, not writing about any policy error or about a
power-grab by one or a few evil individuals. We do see a historically unusual, though
not unprecedented, combination of legal-rational authority with some legitimacy claims
typically existing under traditional authority. Indeed the managed, illiberal, democratic
prebendal states use a substantial dose of “traditionalism” or “conservatism” such as the
centrality of religion, patriotism, the traditional family, or the sacredness of life in their
ideology. It is illiberal, traditionalistic, conservative, or if you want to put it this way:
neo-conservative, or even paleo-conservative. But these practices “inevitably”—if
anything is “inevitable” in human history—stem from the accelerated transition from
socialism to market capitalism within a democratic framework. Putin and United
Russia, Orbán and FIDESZ are reasonably close to being the “pure types” of what I
am trying to describe, but the “virus”—no value judgment is meant here to be implied
by the term—is in all post-communist democratic societies.
Russian and Hungarian liberal intellectuals tend to demonize Putin or Orbán and
these intellectuals do not notice that these politicians have their “twin soul brothers” in
virtually all post-communist societies. The Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland,
Vladimir Mećiar and Robert Fico in Slovakia, in some respects Boyko Borisov in
22 Theor Soc (2016) 45:1–24
Bulgaria, Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic… and many others represent the same or
similar politics and ideology. What the real aim is of Johannis’s anti-corruption campaign
in Romania is an intriguing question. Klaus Johannis himself was accused of corruption. Is
he “cleansing” Romania or is he involved in selective criminalization? In foreign policy
they often are very different. Orbán is the most supportive of Putin, even in the Ukrainian
crisis; Kaczyński, while a Euro-skeptic like Orbán, is vehemently opposed to Russia.
What is unique about Putin and Orbán is not so much what they are standing for, but
who they are: they have a dose of charisma. Whether this is “genuine charisma” or just
“fake charisma” can be debated, but it is hard to doubt that, unlike the other tradition-
alist leaders I mentioned, they can win and re-win election. They both have an
enthusiastic and loyal following, though we know their charisma can be withdrawn
as soon as the leaders stop delivering “miracles.”
The most intriguing, China, seem to be conversing with Putinism as well. President Xi is
making a bid to become a “charismatic leader”; he allows the official media to call him
“father Xi.” He gives long addresses to scientists and writers about what they should do and
his campaign against “corruption” sounds very much like the selective criminalization of the
“illiberal democracies” of post-communist European countries. Bo Xilai was a Maoist
challenger of the current leadership of the Communist Party. Was he convicted for life
imprisonment because he was corrupt, or was it a case of selective criminalization? Former
PrimeministerWen’s family was reported to own billions of dollars; BoXilai was accused of
corruption for only a couple ofmillion dollars. TheWen familywas not investigated; BoXilai
got a life sentence. The anti-corruption campaign is suspiciously similar to Putinism. Is China
on its way to prebendalism? I do not have enough evidence to tell, but the attack against Bo
Xilai and his supporters looks rather similar. Bo Xilai’s wife, Gu Kailai, was sentenced also
for a life imprisonment for themurder of an English associate (lover? business partner?), Neil
Heywood, in a suspiciously short trial, which lasted only for a few days. Sowho knowswhat
the truth is. Butwhat is certain is that China ismoving toward a one-man rule, unknown since
the fall of Mao, and the judiciary is being used to catch political enemies. Post-communism
from China to Russia to Eastern Europe may be converging on an illiberal prebendal system.
The transition from communism has been guided by the principles of legal-rational
authority, what I call liberalism and democracy, what I identify as majoritarian selection
of the leaders, Wille der Beherrschten. Given the challenges of fast pace of transition,
especially of the conversion of public ownership to private wealth, liberal democracy
was not consolidated in most—or any?—of these countries. All of these countries—or
most of them—are pregnant with a dose of patrimonialism, prebendalism, and illiber-
alism, and such potentialities come to fruition as long as their charismatic leaders
deliver miracles by providing at least the impression of security and improving welfare.
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